A structural view: Nuclear Suppliers Group,NSG
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2008-08-05 05:58:05 - Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a group of nuclear supplier countries which seeks to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear related exports.

NSG was created following the explosion in 1974 of a nuclear device by a non-nuclear-weapon State, India which demonstrated that nuclear technology transferred for peaceful purposes could be misused.

The participating nations are:

ARGENTINA, AUSTRALIA, AUSTRIA, BELARUS, BELGIUM, BRAZIL, BULGARIA, CANADA, CHINA, CROATIA, CYPRUS, CZECH REPUBLIC, DENMARK, ESTONIA, FINLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY, GREECE, HUNGARY, IRELAND, ITALY, JAPAN, KAZAKHSTAN, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, LATVIA, LITHUANIA,

LUXEMBOURG, MALTA, NETHERLANDS, NEW ZEALAND, NORWAY, POLAND, PORTUGAL, ROMANIA, RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SLOVAKIA, SLOVENIA, SOUTH AFRICA, SPAIN, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, TURKEY, UKRAINE, UNITED KINGDOM, and UNITED STATES

NSG Chairman nation for year 2008/2009 is Country Germany.
The European Commission participates as an observer.

Factors taken into account for participation include the following:
The ability to supply items (including items in transit) covered by the Annexes to Parts 1 and 2 of the NSG Guidelines;
Adherence to the Guidelines and action in accordance with them;
Enforcement of a legally based domestic export control system which gives effect to the commitment to act in accordance with the Guidelines;
Adherence to one or more of the NPT, the Treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Tlatelolco, Bangkok or an equivalent international nuclear non-proliferation agreement, and full compliance with the obligations of such agreement(s);
Support of international efforts towards non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their delivery vehicles.

The NSG Guidelines were published in 1978 as IAEA Document INFCIRC/254 (subsequently amended), to apply to nuclear transfers for peaceful purposes to help ensure that such transfers would not be diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities.

The 1990 NPT Review Conference, a number of recommendations were made by the committee reviewing the implementation of Article III, which had a significant impact on the NSG's activities in the 1990s.

In 1992, the NSG decided to establish Guidelines for transfers of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, material and technology (items which have both nuclear and non-nuclear applications) which could make a significant contribution to an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activity. These Dual-Use Guidelines were published as Part 2 of INFCIRC/254, and the original Guidelines published in 1978 became Part 1 of INFCIRC/254.

The endorsement at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC) of the full-scope Safeguards policy already adopted by the NSG in 1992 clearly reflects the conviction of the international community that this nuclear supply policy is a vital element to promote shared nuclear non-proliferation commitments and obligations.

Participating Governments prepared a comprehensive information paper on the NSG for the 2000 NPT Review Conference. This was disseminated as IAEA document INFCIRC/539/Rev. 1 (Corr.) of November 2000 under the title 'The NSG: Its Origins, Roles and Activities'.

NSG Guidelines include a number of important conditions that help promote nuclear cooperation under sound nonproliferation arrangements. For Trigger List exports, the NSG Guidelines currently require, for example, (1) an agreement between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the recipient state requiring the application of safeguards on all fissionable materials in its nuclear activities (also known as "full-scope IAEA safeguards") -- not just on the exported items, (2) physical protection against unauthorized use of transferred materials and facilities, and (3) restraint in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology, and weapons-usable materials, i.e., exports that could contribute to the acquisition of plutonium or highly enriched unranium.

NSG Guidelines are implemented by each Participating Government in accordance with its national laws and practices. Decisions on export applications are taken at the national level in accordance with national export licensing requirements.

NSG holds the following meetings:

Plenary

The NSG Plenary works on the basis of consensus. Overall responsibility for activities lies with the NSG Participating Governments who meet once a year in a Plenary meeting.
The Plenary can decide to set up working groups, with recommendations by the Consultative Group, on matters such as the review of the NSG Guidelines, the Annexes, the procedural arrangements, information sharing and transparency activities.
The NSG Plenary can also mandate the Chair to conduct outreach activities with specific countries.

Consultative Group (CG)
The CG is the NSG's standing intersessional working body, tasked to hold consultations on issues associated with the Guidelines on nuclear supply and the technical annexes. The CG takes its decisions by consensus.

Information Exchange Meeting (IEM)
The IEM immediately precedes the NSG Plenary and provides another opportunity for Participating Governments to share information and developments of relevance to the objectives and content of the NSG Guidelines.
Working Groups


Naresh Sagar
Author:
Naresh Sagar
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