EFFECT OF GLOBALIZATION ON INDIA’S ECONOMIC GROWTH

INTRODUCTION:

As a new participant in the globalization wave, India went through several structural and policy changes only in early 1990s, even if the awareness of need for opening up country’s borders was started in late 1980s, when Mr. Rajiv Gandhi was at the helm of policy design. With almost 20% devaluation of the Indian rupee in 1991, the process began that for a while slowed down a little but rarely anyone was in doubt about its existence. The recent reports show that Indian economy grew at the record breaking and astonishing pace of 8% growth in real GDP in 2003-2004. The real question is how did the economy that was an “almost autarky” from 1950 to 1985 period, reached to such a realization that gains from trade are there to reap and the economic transition necessary for globalization is a pre-condition for wider economic growth? This paper attempts to investigate if globalization is a cause of India’s economic growth and if the new culture of trade policy change in India is there permanently or temporarily.

The present paper is organized as follows: Section 1 makes the survey of trade policy in period 1950 to 1985, Section 2 summarizes the economic changes in period 1985 to 2005 with special focus on the liberalization attempt in 1991 and its aftereffects. Section 3 summarizes results and makes a conclusion. In general it is not very hard to prove that even a limited attempt of globalization has benefited Indian economy in the best possible way. As it is argued numerous times in other circles and by other economists (such as Prof. Jagdish Bhagwati and T. N. Srinivasan,) the drive of liberalization has to pick up the speed for better and faster gains for the economy.

Section 1: The Big Move Toward Protectionist Posture

The Indian independence movement in 1940s, led by Mahatma Gandhi, was based on the general dislike of anything and everything “foreign”, especially the one originating from Britain. The public rallies to burn imported goods were famous. There was a strong belief that India can produce everything at home, can be “self reliant” and “self dependent” (popularly called “Swadeshi movement”). Moreover, it was believed by strong nationalist movement that the import of any good was there to bring the “foreign dominance”. As a result foreign direct investment was seen to be a curse rather than blessing or a means of attracting higher investment. As a consequence, multi-national corporations were seen as the exploitative entities that merely benefit from cheap labor in the country, and were believed to be the ones that take the profits back home to better their lavish living and conspicuous standard of living.

Naturally, it was hard to convince the policy makers that import substitution was an expensive policy action in economic sense, even if politically it seemed to be a “patriotic” thing to do. This “extreme nationalism” was evident in blindly carried out economic planning process of early days. Leftists had an influence on each economic plan which increased tariffs on almost all imports, and economy resulted into almost “autarky” stage. Table 1 makes the point clear. The export and import were so low that they formed less than one percent of the total world trade. These low figures of trade were by the country that has had roughly 15% of world population. The highest merchandise export figure was reached in 1980 (of $919.8 million) and they declined significantly in 1981 and 1982. For 6 years in a row (from 1979 to 1985) the merchandise exports were stagnant at roughly $700 to $800 million. The services sector did not fair any better. While the services exports were steadily increasing in this period the figures were less that $400.00 million. This was a period when computer technology services were unheard of and services sector in India was poorly developed so exports were not that attractive.

Merchandise imports were highest in 1981 (at $925.5 million) and with that exceptional year they were steadily increasing. One can see the giant jump in imports of merchandise in year 1974, thanks to the first oil price increase by the OPEC. India had not found any indigenous source of oil then and was primarily dependent upon the foreign oil. Nonetheless the total merchandise import bill never crossed $1 billion, one of the primary reasons for that was the tremendous tariff rates and strict quotas on major imports. In 1974, the policy makers, when they were pointed out the tremendous increase in trade (im)balance from $16.2 million (1973) to $160.4 million (1974), efficiently blamed the oil price rise.

In general 1965 to 1985 was a turbulent time period. It witnessed the stagnation of the economy as well as that of Indian trade.

TABLE 1

India’s Trade: 1965-1985

Merchandise Services Merchandise Services Trade

Exports Exports Imports Imports Balance

1965 129.4 62.1 125.3 57.5 4.9

1966 139.3 69.1 146.5 66.2 -8.6

1967 98.9 74.8 152.1 73.2 -57.3

1968 82.5 67.0 130.6 63.0 -51.2

1969 107.1 69.3 107.0 56.8 .9

1970 146.2 85.1 143.5 71.3 2.1

1971 150.8 97.2 200.6 85.0 -49.0

1972 191.7 99.8 215.5 84.0 -25.8

1973 291.0 118.9 326.0 93.2 -16.2

1974 329.4 140.7 476.7 125.3 -160.4

1975 306.5 182.5 441.9 118.3 -102.7

1976 402.0 172.5 427.9 117.2 -22.8

1977 512.6 212.1 564.7 149.8 -48.3

1978 640.3 262.0 618.4 192.1 18.9

1979 779.6 2 92.8 754.1 253.5 -21.2

1980 919.8 279.8 899.9 262.8 -79.1

1981 896.4 302.8 925.5 282.0 -147.9

1982 685.5 340.6 837.6 308.5 -263.2

1983 742.0 342.5 721.6 280.7 -56.9

1984 743.2 347.1 756.6 310.9 -131.3

1985 814.0 394.3 814.3 362.9 -115.1

Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1994, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.

All figures are expressed in millions of US dollars at the current prices.

One of the reasons for this retarded growth in Indian trade was the disoriented trade policy. There was even a problem of assigning priority to industries for importing necessary parts and raw materials. As Bhagwati-Desai put it, “ It was not surprising, therefore, that the agencies involved in determining industry-wise allocation fell back on vague notions of “fairness”, implying pro rata allocations with reference to capacity installed or employment, or shares defined by past import allocations and similar other rules of thumb with out any rationale” (see Bhagwati-Desai (1970) in bibliography, page 290).

The hardship experienced by this virtual “closed economy” was no more evident than in early 1970s when the economy went through numerous shocks. The poor monsoons created agricultural production short-fall leading to severe droughts in some parts of the country. This put pressure on the industrial production which was not progressing very well in the first place. Due to the additional burden exerted by the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, the economy started suffering miserably. Rationing of necessities was common and criminal elements made a heyday by hoarding. The political opposition parties made life miserable for Indira Gandhi government which had a little choice but to blame all starvation on foreign elements. In 1973, came the OPEC oil price shock and the things really went out of control. While country had no reserves to pay for imported oil, the import bill was growing very fast and export earnings were sluggish. See Table 1 figures for 1973 when imports increased from $191.7 million to $291 million and again in 1976 went up to $402 million. Political parties were extremely active. But economically there was no way out. The protectionism was to the highest level. Consider the 350% import tariff rate on automobiles and average tariff rate of 152%. Domestic industries were well protected that they loved being monopolists and had no inclination for technological innovation. The maturity stage, that was supposed to have taken place according to the famous (?) Infant Industry Argument has never arrived. Strict foreign exchange controls were not only required but were very necessary to stop illegal foreign currency and gold smuggling transactions. It was an administrative nightmare where rent seeker made merry and black market constituted half of the official economy. Academicians learned several lessons of how protectionism can ruin the economy and policy makers watched economy reaching to a real low point while they searched for the solutions.

To top the political chaos, the ruling party (Indira Congress) declared emergency restricting many a freedoms and ruthlessly putting anyone in jail, who gave even a hint of “anti-governmental activity”. The country definitely needed a magic for rapid economic growth which could have silenced the political “trouble makers”.

In early 1980s the monsoon god was nice to India. While agricultural sector that was in desperate need to prosper, received a big boost, the industrial sector invented few new technological advances and grew much more rapidly than before. India also realized that she can do much better in service sector. All in all, the economy started prospering at a slow rate but definitely much better than in 1970s. The need for opening up the economy was felt more keenly by Rajiv Gandhi’s government and some reductions in tariff rates were activated in early 1980s. But the real support for globalization, liberalization and reduction in protectionism came in late 1980s.

Section 2: The Wave of Globalization Arrived

In 1980s there were some signs of policy change in Rajiv Gandhi’s Prime Ministership, but the Macro-economy was already damaged by earlier faults. As Aggarwal (2004) puts it “The Macroeconomic crisis reached its peak in 1990 with combined fiscal deficit of Centre and State governments standing at 10% as percentage of GDP, current account balance at 3.3% of GDP backed by a rate of inflation 9.9% despite India’s record economic performance measured in terms of rate of growth of GDP, 6.0 percent, due to high rates of industrial growth of 5.9% and domestic saving ratio of 21.9% of the GDP.” (see Aggarwal, (2004) page 47). Nonetheless this growth was accompanied by strange macro-imbalances that resulted into tremendous external borrowing, leading to heavy external debt of 28.7%. As Joshi-Little (1997) pointed out, “For the first time in her history, India was nearly forced to the prospect of defaulting on her international financial commitment”. Added burden of oil price shock due to Gulf War of 1991 put the country in such a precarious condition that foreign reserves of worth “only 3 weeks of imports” were left in the treasury. Something drastic had to be done.

In June of 1991, when the current Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh was the Finance Minister (and Mr. Narasinha Rao was the Prime Minister), country received first significant shock of globalization and liberalization. This was also the product of strong demand by some well known economists and policy planners for significantly changing the policy structure. While the declared plan reduced the Rupee value significantly by devaluating it by 21% in one day, it also made it abundantly clear that the old ways of high tariff rates were almost completely over. The tariff rates were slashed, more foreign direct investment (FDI) was invited and import quotas were demolished. There were essentially 2 parts of the liberalization program: Structural and Stabilization. Stabilization measures were supposed to be of short-term nature, including such policies as the “austerity in governmental budgets”, which was supposed to bring about the decline in aggregate demand and therefore lower the inflation rate. The structural adjustment was to be of a long-term nature with such measures as the convertibility on current account of the balance of payment, lower restrictions on domestic business and export promotion.

In words of Aggarwal, “Far reaching meaningful changes in trade and exchange rate policies, viz., two bouts of devaluation of the Rupee, sweeping but phased reduction in import tariffs, quantitative restrictions, and quota except on consumer goods, the suspension of cash compensatory support of exports, trimming and rationalizing the structure of mounting export subsidies, full convertibility of the rupee on current account on balance of payment in 1993, moving from a dual exchange rate system in 1992 to a single market determined unified exchange rate system, have been made” ( see Aggarwal, (2004), page 48). These steps not only made a complete switch in the policy moves heretofore, but also showed policy makers’ inclination to move to market oriented economy as the blunders of governmental controls were becoming more and more visible. All in all, these reforms aimed to achieve stability, curb the inflationary pressure and release the breaks on production and productivity. (Aggarwal, page 49).

The post reform years showed quick and efficient recovery from the acute macroeconomic crisis of 1991. The real GDP in 1990s increased at an annual rate of 6% which is even more impressive because the rest of the world was going through a minor recession. The highest increase in real GDP was experienced in 1996-1997 with 7.8% (expected to be surpassed in 2004) Increased production had its effect on the prices. Inflation rate of 13.6 percent in 1991 was reduced to 1.3 percent in 2001-2002, a remarkable achievement by any standard. The monetary policy was carried out responsibly and the fiscal pressures were negative but much more manageable than earlier years. However the fiscal policy austerity program was not totally effective, thanks to the crisis created by Iraq war as well as political troubles all over the country. In first 3 years of 1990s the economic hardships continued partly due to the increased oil price and overall recessionary forces, coupled with political instability, lack of technological innovation, and poor monsoon. The recessionary trend did not last for along time however. The increased international trade freer economy technological improvements prompted by tremendous growth in information technology combined to show the positive effects from 1994. Liberalization at least partially has become effective in attracting foreign direct investment, positive outlook for the Indian economy and overall excitement amongst producers and investors. Indian economy was on the move in a serious way.

As Table 2 shows, in 1994 while the real GDP increased by 5.9%, the inflation rate declined from 13.7% in 1992 to 8.4%. While the interest was still very high, it had some downward pressure. The official unemployment number was very high (36.69 million) but it remained steady, a mild achievement in an increasing population. But as it is evident for several years, the Indian unemployment is beyond the reported figures of unemployed labor. It consists of heavy under-employment, it is marred by extreme poverty partly due to illiteracy. The so called “full-time employment” in India is concentrated mainly in urban sector with very limited industrialization in rural or semi-rural areas of extreme backwardness. Added to those problems are the imperfections of labor market, the complications in collecting the data, the Indian labor employment (or unemployment) is as hard to report as its population survey results. But these imperfections notwithstanding, the economic growth in 1990s looks impressive, it does not matter how one calculates it.

Table 2

Macroeconomic Performance in Post 1991 Years

Year Real GDP Inflation Interest Unemployment Money Supply

Growth Rate Rate No. in Millions Billions of Rs

1991 .96 8.9 17.88 36.3 1046.1

1992 2.3 13.7 18.92 36.75 1120.9

1993 1.5 10.1 16.25 36.27 1330.2

1994 5.9 8.4 14.75 36.69 1695.0

1995 7.3 10.9 15.46 36.74 1883.5

1996 7.3 7.7 15.96 37.43 2148.9

1997 7.8 6.4 13.83 39.14 2419.3

1998 6.5 4.8 13.54 40.01 2703.5

1999 6.5 6.9 12.54 40.37 3161.2

2000 6.1 3.3 12.29 40.34 3495.9

2001 4.0 7.1 12.08 41.99 3846.0

2002 6.2 4.7 11.92 42.36 4318.6

2003 5.5 5.1 11.50 43.10 4822.3

2004 8.0 4.5 10.60 42.50 5402.3

Source: Some figures are from Aggarwal (2004) and some are from IMF’s publication, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 2003.

While the international trade policy was further liberalized, al beit, at a slower rate than many of the academicians argued for, there were signs for further opening up, by reduction in import tariff, convertibility on the current account transactions, freer availability of foreign reserves, and increased zest for inviting foreign direct investment. It appeared that policy makers by 1995 were convinced that globalization is what is needed for faster economic growth. Success sometimes breeds upon itself, and policy makers usually are fast learners especially when political benefits are high. However the growth of 1994-19917 was not perfectly matched by accelerated growth in 1997-2000 period. As Chitre (2003) points out, this sluggishness was due to the slow growth in agricultural sector, not because of industrial slowdown. The international trade as witnessed in Table 3 did not perform poorly either.

Better monsoons of years 2000 to 2004 helped not only the agricultural sector grow faster but also the manufacturing, trade and services sectors moved admirably. In 2004 it became official that Indian economy was second fastest growing in the world, second only to the Chinese economy. In fact, the Chinese economy’s growth is also primarily explained by her newly found affection for openness. The Indian economy, much like the world economy, went through technological change. While the computer mega cities such as Bangalore (that now has 1500 foreign company offices), Hyderabad and Pune grew at a unprecedented rates, the repercussions of this industrial growth was felt in many of the adjacent rural areas. In fact in April 2005, it was confirmed that India officially achieved 8 percent growth in 2004 (Times of India, April 28, 2005)

Table 3

International Trade Performance Post 1991 Years

Exports Imports BOT Exchange rate

In billions of US dollars for 3 columns Rs/SDR

1991 18.09 21.08 4.01 36.95

1992 20.01 22.93 4.71 36.02

1993 22.01 24.1 3.48 43.10

1994 25.52 29.67 6.31 45.81

1995 31.23 37.95 10.21 52.29

1996 33.73 43.78 13.98 51.66

1997 35.20 45.73 13.36 52.99

1998 34.07 44.82 13.60 59.81

1999 36.87 45.55 11.44 59.69

2000 43.13 55.32 13.77 60.91

2001 43.82 50.53 5.97 60.54

2002 52.71 51.41 7.58 65.29

2003 63.45 61.42 8.69 67.27

2004 65.09 77.03 13.37 68.88

Source: IMF’s International Financial Statistics Year book, 2003

Website: www.rbi.org.in/statistics for figures after 1999.

Table 3 shows the drastic turn around of the economy in 1990s in terms of international trade patterns. While the exports increased drastically, the opening of the borders and reduction in tariff rates also allowed the imports to go up. The balance of trade figures were in a manageable amount (almost always less that $14 billion).

What is interesting to point out is that the “non-oil” imports and exports showed a positive balance of trade for the Indian economy since year 2000. Hence oil imports formed the major drain on the foreign reserves and constituted the main reason for balance of trade deficit. While the Services sector picked the exports considerably, important raw material imports have also grown significantly.