CHALLENGES FOR SECURING WATER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

Historically, damage to water and wastewater systems have not received much publicity as a viable threat. Safe and sustainable drinking water has been taken for granted. Today, after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 & 26/11 terrorists has chosen different types of attacks which were not prepared by the security teams, this anti-socialists (terrorists) are planning different types of attacks before it happened it’s our responsibilities to secure them, damage has to be considered not only as a viable threat, but a believable one. It is important that cities, Municipal corporations, provinces, and private companies that own or operate water systems consider what weaknesses may exist throughout their systems, what measures should be taken to prevent future acts of damage, vandalism, or terrorism, and be ready with a well-tested emergency response plan.

Vandalism and Terrorism need to be considered. Vandalism interrupts the supply of water and reduces its quantity. Terrorism contaminates the water and reduces its quality.

Supply interruptions include the destruction of a system, or interference with, reservoir dams, water towers or storage facilities, pumping stations, intakes, valves, treatment plants, the distribution system, or fire hydrants, denying the population drinking water or firefighting protection. Supply interruptions can be caused by any number of acts, including physical destruction, interruption of the supervisory control and data acquisition system, or acts that could reduce the water pressure in a system. Supply interruptions can also occur as an indirect result of contamination. As drinking water is essential to human life, denying it for any period could cause panic and disrupt society.

The recent terror attacks across the world have drawn attention to the security of many institutions, facilities, and systems, including the nation’s water supply and water quality infrastructure. These systems have long been recognized as being potentially vulnerable to terrorist attacks of various types, including physical disruption, bioterrorism/chemical contamination, and cyber attack. Damage or destruction by terrorist attack could disrupt the delivery of vital human services in this country, threatening public health and the environment, or possibly causing loss of life. The potential for terrorism is not new. In 1941, Federal Bureau of Investigation Director J. Edgar Hoover wrote, “It has long been recognized that among public utilities, water supply facilities offer a particularly vulnerable point of attack to the foreign agent, due to the strategic position they occupy in keeping the wheels of industry turning and in preserving the health and morale of the populace.” Water infrastructure systems also are highly linked with other infrastructures, especially electric power and transportation, as well as the chemical industry which supplies treatment chemicals, making security of all of them an issue of concern.

Individual treatment facilities should undertake their own vulnerability assessment. Every facility has different strengths and weaknesses, Most of the treatment plants don’t have proper security plans which opens door to the intruders to get in and act. It is mandatory to plan appropriate modifications to their security systems. Emergency response plans should be updated to reflect the vulnerabilities identified during the assessment.

To actively attempt to prevent all possible scenarios of damage, vandalism, or terrorism is impossible, but steps can be taken to reduce the chances of future occurrences and to make it as difficult as possible for potential attacks to succeed. To secure water system infrastructure against these possible threats, security will have to be scrutinized with renewed vigor.

Security has to be effectively planned to defend against people with many motives, from teenage pranksters vandalizing property to international terrorists bent on mass destruction. When looking at defense of facilities, it is best to look at worst-case scenarios. In defending against saboteurs whose objective is mass destruction, examining the worst-case scenario will capture the lesser motives as well.

The following lists basic security practices are intended to be a general starting point for water facilities. These measures are intended for large plants, but some of the measures will apply to smaller systems. The information was gathered from sources such as foreign experts, domestic facilities, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

The following are general basic security measures to defend water facilities from supply interruptions:

• By using Access control systems we can secure a physical access. Employees, contractors, subcontractors, visitors, delivery personnel, persons digging up water distribution system components or accessing manholes and fire hydrants—all should be checked and guest cards should be issued by entering the personal details. Vulnerable components include treatment plants, reservoirs, reservoir dams, water storage facilities and towers, pumping stations, water intake facilities, chlorine booster stations, and meter and valve boxes. All employees should wear identification badges and should accompany any visitors at the facilities. New employees should be subjected to thorough background checks, and all employees should be subjected to periodic background checks thereafter. All doors on-site should be locked at all times. Keys should be monitored and codes changed periodically, access cards and keys returned if employees are dismissed for any reason.
• To prevent hacking, supervisory control and data acquisition systems proper security measures should be taken and it should not be connected to the Internet. Remaining cyber security should be enhanced.
• All facilities (treatment plants, reservoirs, reservoir dams, water storage facilities and towers, pumping stations, water intake facilities, chlorine booster stations, and meter and valve boxes) should be fenced, be well lighted, and have a perimeter that is monitored by surveillance cameras (with a minimum record a week’s worth of activities) and motion detectors. All gates should be locked and Z barricades set up to stop trucks from running through them. Landscaped beams should surround reservoirs and storage facilities, with an approach slope greater than what a truck could negotiate. Either security personnel should be stationed at the front gate or the facility should not allow access except by appointment or by buzzing the security office.
• Fire hydrants and other entry points to the distribution system should be tamperproof.
• Surveillance cameras should be located on-site at key points, such as at the chlorine storage facilities, chlorine injection areas, filter beds, hazardous chemical and fuel storage areas, and finished water storage areas.
• Redundancy should be built into all systems.
• Proper communication backbone should be there at all remote places for both data and voice
• There should be a backup power source or generator available.
• There should be good communication and coordination among neighboring water utilities. Valved cross-connections should be established. If one facility goes down the other could be used as a backup. Locations of all valves should be known and they should be well maintained and easily accessible for emergencies.
• All reservoir and tank-access panels and vents should be tamperproof.
• Especially in remote locations. Increased surveillance should be encouraged to act as a deterrent.
• A prioritized list of people and phone numbers to be contacted in an emergency should be established, distributed to all personnel on-site and off-site, and kept near all phones. A reverse-Emergency calling system to inform the public should be considered. A reverse-Emergency system will call all lines within a certain area and play a recorded message or warning.
• Frequent hypothetical emergency drills should be held and evaluated based on performance.